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Mixed Extensions of decision-form games
David Carf`ı, Angela Ricciardello
Abstract
In this paper we define the canonical mixed extension of a decision form
game. We motivate the necessity to introduce this concept and we show
several examples about the new concept. In particular we focus our study
upon the mixed equilibria of a finite decision form game. Many devel-
opments appear possible for applications to economics, physics, medicine
and biology in those cases for which the systems involved do not have
natural utility functions but are only capable to react versus the external
actions.
1 Introduction: canonical convexification and
mixed strategies
The Brouwer fixed point theorem and the Kakutani fixed point theorem rep-
resent, together with separation theorems, the main instruments to prove the
existence of equilibria in decision form games. These theorems require the con-
vexity of the strategy sets. This hypothesis is hardly paid: it excludes, for
example, the quite natural situation of finite sets of strategies. In his famous
book written with O. Morgenstern, John Von Neumann, changing perspective,
conceived situations where the assumption of convexity becomes natural and
where it is needed to extend the finite context providing new sharp solutions.
This latter Von Neumann’s intuition leads to the canonical convexification of a
strategy space.
Definition (of canonical convexification). Let E be a finite set of m
elements. We identify the set E with the set m of the first m positive integers
and define canonical convexification of E, in the euclidean space Rm, or
canonical mixed extension of E, the set
Mm := {p ∈ R
m : p ≥ 0 et ‖p‖1 = Σp = 1},
i.e., the canonical (m− 1)-simplex of Rm.
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Remark. The canonical convexification of a strategy set E withm elements
is clearly a compact and convex subset of Rm.
Canonical immersion. We can imbed the finite strategy set E in the
canonical simplex Mm, through the function µ mapping the i-th element of E
(we mean the element corresponding with the integer i in the chosen identifica-
tion of E with m) into the i-th element µi of the canonical basis µ of the vector
space Rm, that is the mapping defined by
µ : E →Mm : i 7→ µ (i) := µi,
or, in our context,
µ : m→ Mm : i 7→ µ (i) := µi.
Obviously, the function µ is injective, and it is said the canonical immersion of
the finite set E into the canonical simplex Mm. There is no matter of confusion
in the identification of the immersion µ with the canonical basis (µi)
m
i=1 of the
vector space Rm, since this basis is nothing but the family indexed by the set
m and defined by µ(i) := µi (recall that a family x of points of a set X is a
surjective function from an index set I onto a subset of X , and it is denoted by
(xi)i∈I).
Canonical simplex as convex envelope of the canonical basis. We
note again, that the canonical simplex Mm is the convex envelope of the canon-
ical base µ of the vector space Rm, so we have, in symbols, Mm = conv(µ).
Canonical simplex as the maximal boundary of the unit ‖.‖1-ball.
We note moreover, that the canonical simplex Mm is the maximal boundary
(with respect to the usual order of the space Rm) of the unit ball with respect
to the standard norm
‖.‖1 : x 7→ Σ
m
i=i |xi| ,
so we have, in symbols,
Mm = ∂B‖.‖1 (0m, 1).
2 Intepretations and motivations
Interpretation of the elements of the canonical simplex. John von Neu-
mann proposed to interpret the points of the canonical simplex p ∈ Mm asmixed
strategies of a player. According to this interpretation, a player does not choose
a single strategy i ∈ E but he instead plays all the strategies of his strategy set
E, deciding only the probability distribution p ∈ Mm according to which any
strategy must be played, in the sense that the strategy i will be employed with
probability pi.
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Mixed strategies to hide intentions. By adopting a mixed strategy,
an decision-maker hides his intentions to his opponents. Playing randomly the
strategies at his own disposal, by choosing only the probabilities associated to
each of them, he prevents his opponents by discovering the strategy that he is
going to play, since he himself does not know it.
Mixed strategies as beliefs about the actions of other players. As-
sume we have a two-player interaction without possibility of communication,
even if the two players of the game do not desire to hide their own strategic
intentions, the first player (say Emil), for instance, does not know what strategy
the second player (say Frances) will adopt, and vice versa. Emil can assume
only the probability whereby Frances will play her strategies; so, actually, what
Emil is going to face are not the pure strategies adopted by Frances but his
own probabilistic beliefs about the Frances’ strategies, i.e. the mixed strategies
generated by the Frances’ process of immersion into her canonical simplex, the
process of convexification.
Dynamic. By convexifying the sets of strategies, we are no longer in the
original static context, because this random game can be seen as a repeated
game. The convexification is a first step towards a dynamic context.
Cooperative game. This process of convexification can be adopted also
in the context of cooperative games, where we can convexify the sets of player
coalitions.
3 Mixed extension of vector correspondences
After the process of convexification of the strategy space E of a player, we should
extend in a consistent manner all the functions and correspondences defined on
E. The following definition is a first step in this direction and it extends the
correspondences defined on the strategy space of a player and with values in a
vector space.
Definition (of canonical extension). Let
→
X be a vector space (carried by
the set X), let m be the set of the first m natural numbers and let c : m → X
be a correspondence. We say canonical extension of the correspondence
c (to the vector space Rm) the multifunction exc : Rm → X defined by
exc(q) :=
m∑
i=1
qic(i),
for each vector q in Rm.
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Remark. Note that the above definition works, since in a vector space we
can sum two subsets and multiply a subset by a scalar, obtaining other subsets
of the space.
Remark. In the above definition we extended the correspondence c to the
whole of the space Rm, and so in particular to the canonical (m− 1)-simplex of
the space.
Example (extension of a function). Let E be the set of the first three
natural numbers and c : E → R4 the correspondence defined by c(i) = iµi+1,
for any element i in the set E, where µ is the canonical basis of the vector space
R
4. For each triple q ∈ R3, we have
exc(q) =
3∑
i=1
qic(i) =
=
3∑
i=1
qi(iµi+1) =
= (0, q1, 2q2, 3q3).
Remark. If µ is the canonical immersion of the set E into the canonical
simplex Mm (defined above), the following diagram will commute
R
m
exc
→ X
↑µ րc
E
.
We have the following obvious but interesting result.
Proposition. Let c : E → X be a function from the finite set E into a
vector space
→
X (i.e. assume that the correspondence c maps each element of
the set E into a unique element of the carring set X). Then, its canonical
extension exc : Mm → X is an affine function from the convex space Mm into
the vector space
→
X.
Remark (the linearization process induced by a convexification).
The process that associates with the function c : E → X the affine function
exc : Mm → X can be thought as a process of linearization associated to the
convessification process which transforms the finite set E into the convex com-
pact set Mm.
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4 Mixed extension of finite decision form games
In this section we define the mixed extension of a finite decision-form game
(e, f). To this purpose, once convexified the strategy spaces of the players, we
should extend in a consistent manner the decision rules defined between them.
The following definition provides the extension of a decision rule in this case.
We recall that a decision form game is a pair of correspondences (e, f) defined
respectively on two nonempty sets E,F as follows e : F → E and f : E → F ,
the pair of sets (E,F ) is said the strategy base or strategy carrier of the game.
Definition (canonical extension of a decision rule). Let G = (e, f) be
a game with a strategy carrier (E,F ), let E be the set of the first m natural
numbers and F the set of the first n natural numbers. We say canonical
extension of the decision rule e : F → E to the pair of spaces (Rn,Rm) the
correspondence exe : Rn → Rm defined by
exe(q) :=
n∑
j=1
qjµ(e(j)),
for each q in Rn, where µ represents the canonical immersion of the set E
into the vector space Rm. Analogously we define the canonical extension of the
decision rule f .
Remark. Note, for instance in the univocal case, that the vector exe(q) is a
linear combination of the canonical vectors µi of R
m. Therefore, if q is chosen
in the (n − 1)-canonical simplex of the space Rn, the vector exe(q) will be a
convex combination of the vectors of the canonical base of Rm and therefore,
it will belong to the (m− 1)-canonical simplex of Rm. In other words, if q is a
Frances’ mixed strategy then the vector exe(q) will be an Emil’s mixed strategy.
So we can proceed using only the canonical simplexes.
Definition (mixed extension of a decision-form game). Let G = (e, f)
be a decision form game with a strategy carrier (E,F ), where E is set of the first
m natural numbers and F the set of the first n natural numbers. Assume Mm
and Mn be the two convex spaces of mixed strategies of the two players, respec-
tively. We say mixed extension of the decision form game G the decision
form game exG := (exe,ex f), where the decision rules are the multifunctions
exe : Mn →Mm and
exf : Mm →Mn defined by
exe(q) :=
n∑
j=1
qjµ(e(j)),
exf(p) :=
m∑
i=1
piν(f(i)),
for each mixed strategy p in Mm and for each mixed strategy q in Mn, where µ
and ν are the canonical immersions of the Emil’s and Frances’ (finite) strategy
spaces into the two canonical simplexes Mm and Mn, respectively.
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Remark (for the univocal case). With reference to the above definition,
in the univocal case we have simply
exe(q) :=
n∑
j=1
qjµe(j),
exf(p) :=
m∑
i=1
piνf(i),
for each mixed strategy p in Mm and for each mixed strategy q in Mn. Since
the images e(j) and f(i) contain only one element.
Interpretation in Decision Theory. Restrict ourselves, for a moment,
to the univocal case (in which the decision rules are functions). If Emil assumes
that Frances will adopt the mixed strategy q ∈Mn, he will have to face all the
Frances’ pure strategies, i.e. the full strategy system ν (canonical base of Rn),
weighed by the probabilistic system of weights q. Therefore, the only rational
move for Emil is to play all his own possible reactions to the strategies νj , i.e. to
play the reaction system (µe(j))
n
j=1, using the same distribution of the weights
q used by Frances ; in this way Emil will obtain the mixed strategy
exe(q) :=
n∑
j=1
qjµe(j).
5 Extension of finite univocal games
Before to proceed we define a useful tool that will allows us to construct imme-
diately the mixed extension of a decision rule between finite strategy spaces.
Definition (the matrix of a function between finite sets). Let m
and n be two natural numbers and let f : m→ n be a function from the set m of
the first m strictly positive natural numbers into the set n of the first n strictly
positive natural numbers. We say matrix of the function f the matrix, with
m columns and 2 rows, having as first row the vector (i)mi=1, i.e. the m-vector
having for i-th component the integer number i, and as second row the vector
(f(i))mi=1, i.e. the real m-vector having as i-th component the image f(i) of the
integer number i under the function f .
Example (with univocal rules). Let n be the set of the first n strictly
positive integers and let e : 3→ 2 and f : 2→ 3 the Emil’s and Frances’ decision
rules, respectively, with corresponding matrices
Me =
(
1 2 3
1 1 2
)
, Mf =
(
1 2
3 2
)
.
Note that the game G = (e, f) has no equilibria (an equilibrium is a pair of
strategies (x, y) such that x ∈ e(y) and y ∈ f(x)), since the two elements of
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the set 2 could not be equilibrium strategies for Emil (that is first component
of some equilibrium pair). Indeed, we have for those two strategies the two
corresponding evolutionary (reactivity) paths
1→f 3→e 2, 2→f 2→e 1.
In order to obtain the mixed extension of the game G, we denote by b and b′
the canonical bases of the spaces R2 and R3, respectively. By imbedding the
two finite strategy spaces into their respective simplexes, we can transform the
two matrices Me and Mf , obtaining their formal extensions
exMe =
(
b′1 b
′
2 b
′
3
b1 b1 b2
)
, exMf =
(
b1 b2
b′3 b
′
2
)
.
The mixed extensions of the decision rules are so defined, on the canonical
simplexes M2 and M3 of the two vector spaces R
2 and R3, respectively, by
exe : M3 →M2 : q → q1b1 + q2b1 + q3b2,
exf : M2 →M3 : p→ p1b
′
3 + p2b
′
2;
therefore we have
exe(q) = (q1 + q2, q3),
exf(p) = (0, p2, p1).
Now, by imposing the conditions of equilibrium (recall that a bistrategy (x, y)
of a univocal game is an equilibrium if and only if x = e(y) et y = f(x)) to the
pair (p, q), we have
p =ex e(q) = (q1 + q2, q3), et q =
ex f(p) = (0, p2, p1),
that is {
p1 = q1 + q2
p2 = q3
et


q1 = 0
q2 = p2
q3 = p1
;
from which we deduce immediately


p1 = q1 + q2
p2 = q3 = q2 = p1
q1 = 0
;
now, taking into account that the two vectors p and q are two probability dis-
tributions, we have p = (1/2, 1/2) and q = (0, 1/2, 1/2), so we have found the
unique equilibrium (p, q) in mixed strategies of the decision form game G.
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6 Other univocal examples
Example (morra Chinese). Let the strategies of the two players be the num-
bers 1, 2 and 3 respectively (corresponding with the three strategies scissors,
stone and paper). The best reply decision rules of the two players in the morra
Chinese, i.e. the decision rules which impose to reply to the moves of the other
player in order to win, are the two decision rules e : 3 → 3 and f : 3 → 3 with
associated matrices
Me =
(
1 2 3
2 3 1
)
, Mf =
(
1 2 3
2 3 1
)
;
according to the above rules a player must reply to the strategy scissors by
the strategy stone, to stone by the strategy paper and to paper by the strategy
scissors. Note that the decision form game (e, f) has no equilibria, because the
three Frances’ strategies could not be equilibrium strategies. Indeed, we have
the three evolutionary paths corresponding to any of the feasible strategies
1→e 2→f 3, 2→e 3→f 1, 3→e 1→f 2.
In order to obtain the mixed extension of the game, we denote by b the canonical
basis of the vector space R3. By imbedding the two finite strategy spaces into
their respective simplexes, we can transform the two matrices Me and Mf ,
obtaining their formal extensions
exMe =
(
b1 b2 b3
b2 b3 b1
)
, exMf =
(
b1 b2 b3
b2 b3 b1
)
.
The mixed extensions of the decision rules are defined on the canonical simplex
M3 of the space R
3 by
exe : M3 →M3 : q → q1b2 + q2b3 + q3b1,
exf : M3 →M3 : p→ p1b2 + p2b3 + p3b1;
therefore we have
exe(q) = (q3, q1, q2),
exf(p) = (p3, p1, p2),
for any two mixed strategies p and q in the simplex M3. By imposing the
condition of equilibrium to the pair (p, q), we have


p1 = q3
p2 = q1
p3 = q2
et


q1 = p3
q2 = p1
q3 = p2
,
from which we deduce 

p1 = q3 = p2
p2 = q1 = p3
p3 = q2 = p1
;
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recalling that p and q are probability distributions (indeed they are elements
of the canonical simplex M3), we find that the pair (p, q), with p = q =
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3), is the unique equilibrium in mixed strategies of the game.
Example. Let n be the set of the first n positive integers (> 0) and let
e : 3→ 4 and f : 4→ 3 be the Emil’s and Frances’ decision rules corresponding
to the matrices
Me =
(
1 2 3
4 3 2
)
, Mf =
(
1 2 3 4
3 2 1 3
)
.
Note that the game G = (e, f) has no equilibria, because the three Frances’
strategies could not be equilibrium strategies (for Frances). In fact, we have the
three evolutionary orbits corresponding with any of the Frances’ strategies
1→e 4→f 3, 2→e 3→f 1, 3→e 2→f 2.
To obtain the mixed extension of the game, we denote with b and b′ the canonical
bases of R4 and R3, respectively. By imbedding the two finite strategy spaces
into their respective simplexes, we can transform the two matrices Me and Mf ,
obtaining their formal extensions
exMe =
(
b′1 b
′
2 b
′
3
b4 b3 b2
)
, exMf =
(
b1 b2 b3 b4
b′3 b
′
2 b
′
1 b
′
3
)
.
The mixed extensions of the decision rules are defined on the canonical simplexes
M4 and M3 of the vector spaces R
4 and R3, respectively, by what follows
exe : M3 →M4 : q → q1b4 + q2b3 + q3b2,
exf : M4 →M3 : p→ p1b
′
3 + p2b
′
2 + p3b
′
1 + p4b
′
3;
therefore we have
exe(q) = (0, q3, q2, q1),
exf(p) = (p3, p2, p1 + p4).
By imposing the conditions of equilibrium to the pair (p, q), we have


p1 = 0
p2 = q3
p3 = q2
p4 = q1
et


q1 = p3
q2 = p2
q3 = p1 + p4
;
from which we deduce 

p1 = 0
p2 = q3 = p4 = q1
p3 = q2 = p2
;
now, recalling that p and q are probability distributions, we have p = (0, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
and q = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), we thus have found the unique equilibrium (p, q) in
mixed strategies of the game G.
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Example. Let n be the set of the first n positive integers (> 0) and let
e : 4→ 4 and f : 4→ 4 the Emil’s and Frances decision rules with matrices
Me =
(
1 2 3 4
1 2 1 2
)
, Mf =
(
1 2 3 4
3 4 3 4
)
.
Note that the decision form game G = (e, f) has the two “pure” equilibria (1, 3)
and (2, 4). In fact, we have the following four evolutionary orbits corresponding
to the Frances’ strategies
1→e 1→f 3, 2→e 2→f 4, 3→e 1→f 3, 4→e 2→f 4.
Anyway, we desire to see if there are mixed equilibria that are not pure equi-
libria. To obtain the mixed extension of the game G, we denote with b the
canonical basis of R4. By imbedding the two finite strategy spaces into R4, we
can transform the two matrices Me and Mf into their formal extensions
exMe =
(
b1 b2 b3 b4
b1 b2 b1 b2
)
, exMf =
(
b1 b2 b3 b4
b3 b4 b3 b4
)
.
The mixed extensions of the decision rules are so defined on the simplex M4 of
the space R4, by
exe : M4 →M4 : q → q1b1 + q2b1 + q3b1 + q4b2,
exf : M4 →M4 : p→ p1b3 + p2b4 + p3b3 + p4b4;
therefore we have
exe(q) = (q1 + q3, q2 + q4, 0, 0),
exf(p) = (0, 0, p1 + p3, p2 + p4).
Now, by imposing the conditions of equilibrium to the strategy pair (p, q), we
have 

p1 = q1 + q3
p2 = q2 + q4
p3 = 0
p4 = 0
et


q1 = 0
q2 = 0
q3 = p1 + p3
q4 = p2 + p4
,
from which we deduce 

p1 = q3
p2 = q4
p3 = 0
p4 = 0
et


q1 = 0
q2 = 0
q3 = p1
q4 = p2
;
recalling that p and q are probability distributions, we have p = (a, a′, 0, 0)
and q = (0, 0, a, a′), with a ∈ [0, 1] a probability coefficient and a′ := 1 − a its
probability complement; we have thus finally found infinitely many equilibria
(pa, qa) in mixed strategies for the game G.
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7 Extension of the finite multivocal games
The useful concept of the matrix corresponding with a function between finite
sets can be extended immediately to the multivocal case since it is enough to
consider set valued matrices.
Definition (of matrix of a multifunction between finite sets). Let
f : m → n be a multifunction. We say matrix of f the set valued matrix with
m columns and two rows which have as first row the vector (i)mi=1, i.e. the m-
vector having as i-th component the integer number i, and as second row the
vector (f(i))mi=1 of subsets of n, i.e. the m-vector having as i-th component the
image f(i) (that is a set) of the number i under the correspondence f .
Example (with multivocal rule). Let n be the set of first n positive
integers (> 0) and let e : 2 → 3 and f : 3 → 2 be the Emil’s and Frances’
decision rules with associated matrices
Me =
(
1 2
2 {1, 3}
)
, Mf =
(
1 2 3
1 1 2
)
.
Note that the game G = (e, f) has two equilibria. In fact, we have the two
evolutionary chains
1→e 2→f 1, 2→e 3→f 2.
Therefore the game has the two equilibria (2, 1) and (3, 2). To obtain the mixed
extension of the game G, we denote by b and b′ the canonical bases of R2 and
R
3, respectively. Imbedding the two finite strategy spaces into their respective
euclidean spaces, we can transform the two matrices, obtaining
exMe =
(
b1 b2
b′2 {b
′
1, b
′
3}
)
, exMf =
(
b′1 b
′
2 b
′
3
b1 b1 b2
)
.
the mixed extension of the decision rules are so defined on the two canonical
simplexes M2 and M3 of the vector spaces R
2 and R3, respectively, by
exe : M2 →M3 : q 7→ q1b
′
2 + {q2b
′
1, q2b
′
3} ,
exf : M3 →M2 : p 7→ p1b1 + p2b1 + p3b2;
therefore we have
exe(q) = {(q2, q1, 0), (0, q1, q2)} ,
exf(p) = (p1 + p2, p3),
for any two mixed strategies p and q. By imposing the conditions of equilibrium
to the pair (p, q), we have

p1 = q2
p2 = q1
p3 = 0
et
{
q1 = p1 + p2
q2 = p3
,
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or 

p1 = 0
p2 = q1
p3 = q2
et
{
q1 = p1 + p2
q2 = p3
,
from which, recalling that p and q are probability distributions, we have p =
(0, 1, 0) and q = (0, 1), or p = (0, a, a′) and q = (a, a′), for each a ∈ [0, 1], where
a′ = 1 − a. We have thus found infinite equilibria in mixed strategies, among
which there are the two equilibria in pure strategies (those already seen).
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